Much of the focus on the impact of new technology on employment has been on work which is regarded as repetitive and requiring minimal skills. For the most part it seems that professional occupations have been assumed to be relatively immune to the effects of 'digital disruption'. However, there are now suggestions that this is altering as new software programs have been developed that can undertake at least some of the functions of various professions, including the legal profession. This article seeks to add to the evolving conversation of how new technologies might transform the legal profession as we know it. Beyond this, it also seeks to ask how the content of the law and legal education might also be affected by 'digital disruption', and explore the opportunities such unravelling of the legal profession might present.
The legal profession can be castigated for being slow to innovate because it is thought to be bound by various traditions, a privileged status and a desire for high fees with the consequence that much legal work is provided for the 'moneyed class' thus reinforcing the perception that the profession is elitist and inaccessible to the average person. 1 On the other hand, the resources that high fees enable lawyers to acquire, together with the need to respond to the market that governs the provision of legal services, can also mean that the legal profession will embrace new technologies in order to save time, costs and deliver a superior service to clients. In this sense at least there is no doubt that the manner in which lawyers work today is far different from even 20 years ago. The rise of the academic training of lawyers, the globalization of the legal profession and the impact of technology has transformed the practice of law in ways which even many of us who first entered the study of law in the latter part of the twentieth century could not have imagined. However, this article seeks to move a little beyond those changes and to imagine what the legal profession, the practice of law and legal education might look like in the next 20 years given the impact of what is often referred to as 'digital disruption', that is, the impact of new technologies on not only the work of lawyers but on the very notion of the legal profession and how it may, or may not exist, in the future.
Whatever the future does hold for law and the legal profession there is likely to be much resistance from that profession to accept radical transformation or even the possibility of its own demise. Recent explorations of the effects of technology on professional practice often begin with a discussion about the manner in which professionsincluding the legal professionusually reproduce the justification for their own existence. 2 However, such ideas about the manner in which professions are able to create the reasons for why we need them have been around for many years. For example, Ivan Illich in the latter part of the twentieth century wrote of 'disabling professions:' 3 Professionals assert secret knowledge about human nature, knowledge which only they have the right to dispense. They claim a monopoly over the definition of deviance and the remedies needed. For example, lawyers hold that they alone have the competence, and the legal right to provide assistance in divorce. 4 The monopoly that Illich writes of is, of course, about the creation of wealth for members of the profession. Thus one would expect the members of that profession to defend their existence in order to protect that wealth. Debates about the future of a profession are, after all, not simply about intellectual purity or professional status. That aside, the manner in which professions are able to educate communities about their 'sacred role' does explain much in terms of why resistance, denial or blindness to the impact of technology occurs amongst the legal profession.
Of course, it is important to note that discussions about the impact of new technologies on the practice of law are not driven by a form of technological determinism. Criticisms about the content, practice and priorities of legal education have existed for many years. What we may be witnessing currently therefore is as much a 'techno-facilitated' debate as it is one driven by the advent of those new technologies alone. A self-interested profession may claim the latter is what is happening, and so miss the point that the technology is permitting criticism of legal practice in ways there were not possible before and in so doing is able to write new narratives of and about the law.
The impact of new technology on professional work
There is a view that the legal profession, along with many other professions, is immune from the impact of technology on their existence. This is not the same thing as saying that the practice of law does not now incorporate new technologies. What this refers to is that while some commentators are now debating which jobs will be replaced by new technologies, many have assumed that professional work cannot be automated because of its nature. Thus while many jobs have been altered by new technologies, the fear that jobs will actually disappear has been reserved for those jobs that are regarded as lower skilled and so capable of being mechanized because they are repetitive. Professional work, on the other hand, is thought to involve much more judgment, evaluation and flair, traits thought to be beyond the capacity of algorithms and machines to replicate. However, the first counter is that this fails to recognize the extent to which much legal work is actually repetitive and structured in a way that can easily beand betterdone by new forms of technology. The oft-cited example is e-discovery software that can scan and extract information from documents at a far greater speed than lawyers can:
[i]f search robots armed with blisteringly fast and sophisticated algorithms can instantaneously scrutinise millions of pages of court evidence for the nugget that swings a case, why employ tens of thousands of junior lawyers to do the same? 5
John Markoff, writing about this in The New York Times in 2011 remarked on how such software is replacing lawyersand thus lowering costsfor many clients of law firms. The algorithms that lie behind such software are thought to be more efficient in extracting relevant information and concepts than any human can be. As Markoff comments:
'From a legal staffing viewpoint, it means that a lot of people who used to be allocated to conduct document review are no longer able to be billed out', said Bill Herr, who as a lawyer at a major chemical company used to muster auditoriums of lawyers to read documents for weeks on end. 'People get bored, people get headaches. Computers don't.' 6 And further:
Quantifying the employment impact of these new technologies is difficult. Mike Lynch, the founder of Autonomy, is convinced that the 'legal is a sector that will likely employ fewer, not more, people in the U.S. in the future'. He estimated that the shift from manual document discovery to e-discovery would lead to a manpower reduction in which one lawyer would suffice for work that once required 500 and that the newest generation of software, which can detect duplicates and find clusters of important documents on a particular topic, could cut the head count by another 50 percent. 7 Richard Susskind and Daniel Susskind also document the various ways in which new technologies are changing the nature of legal practice, from the outsourcing of legal advice, document analysis software (referred to above), online access to legislation and judicial decisions, online collaboration spaces, virtual courtrooms and online dispute resolution. 8 In many ways such uses of technology appear almost commonplace now and seem to hold little concern for many in the legal professions. No serious lawyer, after all, would think that they could now practice law without at least some engagement with online resources. Of course, while the replacement of repetitive work with algorithms appears to liberate lawyers from such work, it is also the case that such work was also the means by which junior lawyers learnt the craft of lawyering, such as in the discovery of documents. It may be that this will be lost in the future. In addition, there may be some increase in the use of IT professionals within law firms including those who create a social media presence for law firms. This may also change the overall profile of law firms. Even at this level, the changes wrought by new technologies will likely see shifts in the nature of law and practice.
But more significant shifts and challenges to legal practice may come from other developments such as the sharing of legal experience in online communities, reviews of lawyers online and price comparison and auction of legal services sites. 9 Other technologies may remove the need for (and even thought of) a lawyer altogether:
… interest is developing in embedding legal requirements into our social and working lives, so that, for example, automatic compliance with health-and-safety regulations can be integrated into the design of buildings that can identify and respond when temperature levels are above some statutory level. In this way, human beings do not need to know the law and make a conscious decision to comply, and consequently, lawyers' direct involvement is not needed. 10 One can imagine such technology being applied to motor vehicles, sound systems and other devices which at the moment rely on human control to ensure legal compliance. A possibly even more important development relates to digital technology moving into areas where judgments are made and so challenges the notion that it is just repetitive tasks that are the target of new technologies. Some of the arguments about the effect of new technology on the legal profession rely here on analogous developments in other professions. For example, in the medical area Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies have developed in a way that enables them to absorb all the relevant medical literature in order to diagnose an illness as compared with a human who would need 160 hours a week to read to keep up with all the latest developments. 11 Thus 'thinking machines' are being developed which challenge professions previously thought safe from new technology because they required a degree of judgment being applied to situations and problems in ways not thought to be possible for technology to replicate:
… computerisation is entering the domains of legal and financial services. Sophisticated algorithms are gradually taking on a number of tasks performed by paralegals, contract and patent lawyers. More specifically, law firms now rely on computers that can scan thousands of legal briefs and precedents to assist in pre-trial research. A frequently cited example is Symantec's Clearwell system, which uses language analysis to identify general concepts in documents, can present the results graphically, and proved capable of analysing and sorting more than 570,000 documents in two days. 12 When Frey and Osborne wrote this they still regarded the lower skilled jobs within the profession as most at risk: … we find that paralegals and legal assistantsfor which computers already substitutein the high risk category. At the same time, lawyers, which rely on labour input from legal assistants, are in the low risk category. Thus, for the work of lawyers to be fully automated, engineering bottlenecks to creative and social intelligence will need to be overcome, implying that the computerisation of legal research will complement the work of lawyers in the medium term. 13 9 Ibid. However, more recent analyses question this. The manner in which technology impacts on the legal profession is complex and not simply a matter of algorithms. For example, one way in which the profession is changing is by way of the outsourcing and offshoring of legal work made possible by way of new communications technologies. The education of lawyers in overseas locations by way of online learning facilitates this process thereby reconstructing where the 'local' profession is 'located':
[i]n India, for example, there are armies of call center workers and IT professionals, as well as tax preparers versed in the US tax code and attorneys specifically trained not in their own country's legal system but in American law, and standing ready to perform low-cost legal research for US firms engaged in domestic litigation. 14 A possible response to this is that this merely replicates developments in other industriesthe relocation of 'drudge' work to low wage countries. Martin Ford, however, is of a different view. He considers that offshoring usually precedes the automation of such work and that 'the jobs it creates in low-wage nations may prove to be short-lived as technology advances. What's more, advances in artificial intelligence may make it even easier to offshore jobs that can't be fully automated.' 15 As cost savings drives this process, another question to ask is whether the actual content of the law might be recast in ways that easily translate into algorithms. Laws which are more 'black and white' may fit better with certain software programs that analyse and apply them than laws which require the making of many and varied subjective evaluations.
Clearly much of what has been said so far relies on the further development of AI to a point that enables many so-called 'higher level' legal professional roles to be done by technology rather than humans. Naturally, this is to some extent an attempt to predict the future. This aspect of the discussion is in many ways impossible to respond to. The aim of this article is not to do so, other than to note that some commentators such as Susskind and Susskind, in attempting to predict the future impact of technology on the legal professions caution against 'irrational rejectionism'. For them this is where a lack of knowledge of the actual manner in which technology applies to the legal profession leads to: the denial of any impact; 16 a 'technological myopia' which measures the technology of tomorrow against the weaknesses of today's technology and hence sees it as more limited than some would state it to be; 17 and the 'AI fallacy' which regards technology as only able to oust professional experts if it replicates the way humans think:
This anthropocentric view of 'intelligent' systems is limiting. It emboldens both professionals and commentators, for example, to leap from the observation that computers cannot 'think' to the unwarranted conclusion that systems cannot undertake tasks at a higher standard than human beings. 18 Instead, Susskind and Susskind contend that such technology differs from human beings but is more efficient. In other words the technology is changing the manner in which professional work is constructed. 19 It is this observation that seems to have potentially transformative aspects for the legal profession and the legal education. So far, the discussion about the new technologies and their impact on employment tends to focus on the simple matter of whether jobs will be lost or not. While understandable as an immediate focus of concern, if the impact will be as dramatic as various commentators suggest then there seems an urgent need to engage with the detail of such technologies and how they will change the nature of legal work and how in turn those changes will affect the nature of both the law and legal education. This is not to suggest that what will occur is pre-determined. A central concern of the law in relation to technology has been the extent to which the application and use of technology conforms to various ethical and legal expectations. 20 The extent of the impact of new technologies on legal practice must still be influenced by human choices even if technology appears to overwhelm us.
Technology and the transformation of the legal profession: back to the future? To properly understand the possible impacts of new technologies it is important to consider some of the concerns stated by Susskind and Susskind that propel the take up of technology in this area. It is clear that they are advocates for a more open and accessible legal profession and that they identify a number of questions that might support the usefulness of new technologies. They ask whether professional work might be more affordable, accessible and of a better quality as well as advocating that 'in a technology-based Internet society, there must be scope for making at least some of the knowledge and experience of experts available on a different basis'. 21 They also question whether all the work now done by professionals needs to be done by such qualified people at all and note 'that that much that goes on today under the umbrella of professional service is in fact routine and repetitive'. 22 Another question is the extent to which a profession can be trusted to transform itself. 23 This latter issue is also connected with the matter of self-regulation of the legal profession. In this context, is selfregulation as the hallmark of a profession a barrier to reform, or something that may be weakened by the digital revolution and lost as an important cornerstone of an independent legal profession?
Susskind and Susskind's analysis is heavily dependent on the notion that professions subscribe to old fashioned ways of distributing knowledge which is out of touch with the way such information is now stored and accessed:
… consider that in the professions, knowledge resides in the heads of professionals, in books and filing cabinets, and in the standards and systems of their institutions. Yet this is out of step with the ways in which most information and knowledge is shared in a technology-based Internet society. Additionally, the professions' claims to exclusivity and special treatment rest, in part, on assumptions about the recipients of their work being unable to advise themselves because they lack the expertise, skills, know-how, and experience or, crucially on this narrative, they lack the intellectual wherewithal or facilities to acquire this knowledge for themselves. Again, this is out of step with contemporary behaviour. The Internet has revolutionized our information-seeking habits. Our view is that there is nothing so special or unique about 19 Ibid. 20 See, for example, J Lane, V Stodden, S Bender and H Nissenbaum, Privacy, Big Data and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014). 21 Ibid 32. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid.
professionals' knowledge to suggest that some of it cannot be made easily accessible and understandable on an online basis. 24 In effect they argue for the empowering ability of new technologies through providing people with the capacity to solve their own problems, rather than depending on professionals. 25 This is not a new critique of professions, as it reflects much of Illich's views referred to above. In the same vein Jonathan Caplan wrote in the past:
Removing dependence on professionals requires encouragement to help oneself. In the field of law, such encouragement can only be provided by adapting the legal system which, at virtually every stage, currently re-inforces the cult of dependence. Perhaps the starting point would be to strip the law of its majestic image and to dispense so far as possible with the full panoply of legal proceedings. Solutions to human affairs ought to be worked out in a human atmosphere and not an orator's arena baited with procedural traps. The drift towards complexity by our legislative assemblies should also be checked: there is no merit in obscurity or in over-legislating, and the more complex and obscure we make our legal systems, the more firmly entrenched are those professionals who alone claim to understand it. 26 This indicates a number of important points about the impact of new technologies on the practice of law. As noted above, the ideas about professional roles advanced by Susskind and Susskind are not new. This is not to denigrate them however, but to note that the impulse for a more open, accountable, affordable and empowering legal profession has been with us for some time. It is also apparent that if the practice of the law does become a more open and participatory process then this must create some pressure to adapt the very shape of the law. Certainly, more emphases on alternative dispute resolution may be an example of an area of legal practice that, while still heavily controlled by legal practitioners, is shaped outside the formal institutions of the law such as courts. New technologies making legal knowledge even more widely available, combined with processes which by-pass legal professionals will only increase that pressure. For example, Susskind and Susskind note that each year three times as many people use ebay online dispute resolution processes than file lawsuits in all US courts. 27 Thus it would be a mistake to assume that the adoption of new technologies in law's practice is driven solely by that technology. Such technology is driven by a number of factors, including the desire of many to make the law cheaper and more accessible. Given that, it means that there is then an impulse to adapt the shape of the law itself to accommodate that desire. This may have both positive and negative aspects. Put simply, do the algorithms and new technologies that might be harnessed to make the law simpler, cheaper and accessible require certain types of laws? For example, automated online sentencing processes may hand out sentences according to intricate algorithms that may well include something that looks like the application of human discretion, but to what extent can such algorithms deal with the unexpected, quirky or unique individual that may require appeals to a sense of justice? In other words, can an algorithm have a heart? 24 Ibid 34. 
Implications for legal education
The possible limitations of new technologies in this way and the more general manner in which the adoption of such technologies to replace lawyers may change the very content and shape of the law also has clear implications for legal education and the role of law as a discipline within the University. 28 Clearly, the nature of legal education and how it can be improved has been the subject of many reviews and inquiries in many jurisdictions, including very recently. 29 For the most part such reports, as one would expect, place technology in the role of something which affects legal practice, and so needs to be harnessed, but which does not necessarily threaten the very existence of the profession. However, the narrative around technology is shifting as a recent UK report acknowledges in its discussion of the role of commercial and social awareness as an aspect of legal education:
There is also a case for including a greater understanding of the transformative potential of information technology under this heading. It is not sufficient to ensure that trainees or prospective trainees understand how technology is used to facilitate current work tasks without also helping them to understand how it can radically change, and is changing, their business models and the way clients may access and use legal information. In this context Richard Susskind's … suggestion that law schools should include an optional course on developments in legal services deserves to be taken seriously. 30 One could be critical and suggest that even this places technology on the perimeter but it nevertheless does illustrate the point that technology is no longer simply something for lawyers to be competent in I, but that it may well re-define the role of lawyers in much more substantial ways.
For the University the attraction of offering a law degree is often driven by student perceptions that it can lead to significant incomes after graduation and so leads to student demand for such courses. However, this attraction sits on the same foundations which are now under challenge from new technologies. The push to make law more affordable, accessible and simpler strikes at the basis upon which legal practitioners can demand high fees. What role does the discipline of law play within the University in the wake of such change? On the one hand, it could take on the legal training of other students beyond the Law School to expand its intake, which might see what often is somewhat pejoratively referred to as 'service teaching' becoming a more central function of the group of academics that are well placed to explain the law to others. On the other hand, Law Schools may aspire to be even more selective and teach to the few highly specialized lawyers still required to service areas that remain beyond the scope of technology to replicate.
There seem a number of other possible pathways that University Law Schools may take to respond to the changes new technologies may make to the future of the legal profession. Each of these pathways take as their starting point an acceptance that new technologies will result in a radical transformation at the very least of the legal profession, resulting in shifts 
Creating imaginative lawyers
One obvious pathway involves re-thinking the law curriculum around the need to create a more imaginative and creative law graduate. This responds to the perceived limitation of new technologies and algorithms. It is said that they such technologies have inherent limitations as algorithms upon which they are based as they rely on things being done the same way over time. What is said they cannot replicate is human creativity and innovation, because humans are imaginative while machines need pattern recognition. 31 However, as Brynjolfsson and McAfee observe imagination is not widely taught at all: Unfortunately, though, these skills are not emphasized in most educational environments today. Instead primary education often focuses on rote memorization of facts, and on the skills of reading, writing and arithmetic … 32
They argue for the need to teach the skills of ideation, large frame pattern recognition and complex communication and not just the three Rs to prepare and protect students from the threat of technology. 33 They also cite a study by Arum and Roska in 2010 34 that suggests that college students in the United States are not acquiring these skills, in part because they only spent 9% of their time studying and 42% of their time socializing. There were no demands placed on the students by faculty to read and write more, or to use the technology to increase the skills they need to preserve their place in society. 35 While many legal academics will have many anecdotes of law students who read little, what also needs to be considered is whether the curriculum itself engages students sufficiently to both retain their interest as well as providing students with the knowledge base they need for the future. The notion that law students need to be encouraged to be imaginative may present its own challenges to a faculty which itself was educated in a different time when the legal profession retained its traditional role in society. Overall, it does suggest the need to challenge law students to think more critically about law's possibilities rather than to consider themselves legal technicians that robotically apply the law to a set of facts with a given answer. Such approaches to the law lend themselves to algorithmic responses and the removal of human practitioners.
Educating for 'non-traditional' legal practice Another possibility is that Law Schools will have to accept that many of those who use the law are not going to be lawyers in the traditional sense. This suggests a number of consequences for legal education. One is that the dominance of commercial law areas within Law may shift dramatically. Many of the new technologies aim to reduce high costs to the clients of lawyers, who currently serve overwhelmingly the needs of the monied class. For those who have legal needs and who are poor, the practice of law has always been of a different nature with different imperatives. 36 In many cases the poor have either had to fend for themselves through their interaction with the legal system, rely on often under-funded legal aid schemes, or seek the assistance of other professionals such as social workers who may have a limited legal education.
Imaginative legal educators (and lawyers) may see the opportunity here to carve out some niche for those law graduates who may seek to practice in areas such as poverty law, human rights or social welfare law. While these are clearly already pathways for some, they nevertheless are usually areas to which few now aspire. However, what may also change here is that rather than this pathway providing a traditional lawyer-client model of practice, new technologies may enable such lawyers to be a resource that may empower others to deal with their own legal problems in ways that are effective and accessible. Such philosophies are already a part of many who work in community law centres, but new technologies may enhance such approaches and in effect render this form of or legal practice more mainstream.
For Law Schools though the numbers of graduates moving into such fields may still be limited. As noted earlier, this may lead to the view that all professions require legal knowledge and that an understanding of the legal context of their work and so legal education delivery may in time shift the very notion of who a 'law student' is. It seems consistent with the push to utilize new technologies to make the law more accessible and for legal practice to be something that anyone might do in terms of solving their own legal problems to expand the availability of legal analysis to students in other disciplines. In time one might expect this would also change the law's sense of itself as it too is influenced more directly with the legal needs of other disciplines.
In many ways this pathway liberates law from the narrow concerns of the moneyed class and opens itself up to new influences and new challenges. Thus for those that may still claim the mantle of 'lawyer' the skills required may be of a different order to those currently nurtured in Law Schools. In other words, if new technologies will destroy the traditional lawyer-client roles, we have not even begun to imagine how this changes the way in which Law is taught. It may also lead to greater emphasis on teaching judicial techniques as a central concern of legal practice, especially if the need for judges remains for longer than the diminishing demand for lawyers. This will depend on the precise manner in which new technologies develop and whether society demands the retention of human judges over algorithms. 37
Towards truly critical law schools
If there is a radical transformation in the legal profession and the loss of its monopoly over legal services, Law Schools face themselves either possible extinction, being submerged into other faculties or carving out a new distinctive role in the law. Given that Law will continue to play an important role in society, there is clearly an important role for critical analysis and discussion of the content of law. Perhaps the technological impact on legal practice will generate the consequence of a freer law school, relatively unconstrained by a weakened legal profession, and able to pursue the critical study of law as an end in itself. By this I do not mean 'critical' in the sense of being broadly analytical, but more in the vein of the 36 See, for example, S Wexler, 'Practicing Law for Poor People ' (1970) critical legal studies movement. It is thus an approach to legal education that is prepared to challenge the notion that law is a neutral institution and argues that the role of such an education is to do more than train legal practitioners. It is view of the law school that others also foresee in the future. 38 One reason for wishing Law Schools to develop a more critical approach to the content of Law is that clearly not all of the impacts of new technology will be fashioned to benefit all people. There must be a deep concern that algorithms may replace advocacy for the poor and the powerless while the rich retain the services of the few lawyers that remain. For example, will Law Schools discuss the extent to which algorithms may remove discretion and the human element from the justice system? Can all legal problems be reduced to an algorithm in any event or even if they can be, might they be written in ways that may appear to remove bias and discrimination, but in fact embed it? In other words, if new technologies are thought to bring more accountability to the legal profession by making its processes more transparent, who ensures that the algorithms are held to account? Where will such questions appear in the law school curriculum? Such questions will require well informed and new forms of legal scholarship to provide that critique and develop the critical approaches to the use of algorithms in making judgments in other areas of human life. 39 As Citron and Pasquale say:
Scoring systems have a powerful alluretheir simplicity gives the illusion of precision and reliability. But predictive algorithms can be anything but accurate and fair. They can narrow people's life opportunities in arbitrary and discriminatory ways. 40 They call, in effect, for greater transparency of how such algorithms work in order to then enable human oversight. Yet, humans can also be arbitrary and discriminatory, which can be at least a superficial attraction of 'law by algorithm'. However algorithms can disguise discriminatory assumptions about human behaviour within what purports to be an objective measure of a group of people. As dana boyd et al have observed:
Discussions around privacy and fairness in a datacentric world typically rest on the notion of individual control over information, but our networks reveal a great deal. While American law and much of society may focus on the individual, our identities are entwined with those of others. Algorithms that identify our networks, or predict our behavior based on them, pose new possibilities for discrimination and inequitable treatment. 41 Their solution is not to rely on simply transparency but to 'develop legal, social, and ethical models that intentionally account for networks, not just groups and individuals' as the way to deal with the biases that can be built into algorithms. 42 In this example, if one accepts the premises of authors such as boyd, then the role of the law school must move beyond mere training of lawyers in the 'use' of technology and begin to engage with how that technology may disrupt the justice of the law. In other words, while technology may propel the practice of law in a more mechanistic direction, the role of the law school may well be to counter this by recasting (or as some would contend, continuing) its role as a fierce critic that also shapes the content of law and practice.
Conclusion
The above points may be placed in the category of future forecasts. Many lawyers may well cling to the view that more traditional notions of law and legal practice may still prevail, and they may well be right, for it would be folly to assume that there are no choices in shaping the future. Yet the above discussion also shows that conversations are commencing that do not regard the impact of new technologies on the legal profession and the law as driven simply by those new technologies for their own sake. The proponents of change speak also of democracy, transparency and empowerment. These are the opposites to the messages we often hear about how technology is changing our lives from many who currently engage in legal analyses of technological impact and the law. In that sense views about how technology may transform law and legal practice connect with other views about in whose interests the law and the legal profession work which have been around for many years, but which have not occupied the mainstream. This might suggest that the new technologies may simply be creating the time for certain ideas to have their moment. Indeed, at the very least, the conversations now occurring suggest that 'digital disruption' may create fundamental challenges to the place of law, legal practice and the legal profession in society.
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